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Secrecy and Human Rights Abuse in Australia’s  
Offshore Immigration Detention Centres 
 
Amy Nethery and Rosa Holman 
 
‘In Manus Prison, the pain is there to send you home’.  
Behrooz Boochani, Kurdish asylum seeker from Iran, detained on Manus Island since 
August 2013.1 
 
 
‘This detention is created in such a way as to act as a deterrent, to encourage people to 
return [to their homeland], and to stop other people trying to seek asylum. The 
harmfulness is a ‘designed-in’ feature … You can’t allow transparency, if what you’re 
trying to do is inflict suffering. Secrecy is necessary because these places are designed 
to damage.’ 
Dr Peter Young, former director of mental health services at the International Health 
and Medical Services2 
 
Introduction 
Since 2010, all asylum seekers who arrive in Australia’s territory by boat are moved 
to immigration detention centres on the Pacific island nation of Nauru, or Manus 
Island in Papua New Guinea, where they remain until their applications for refugee 
status are assessed, and they are either returned to their country of origin or resettled 
in a safe third country. This offshore immigration detention regime is characterised by 
a high degree of secrecy, low levels of transparency and accountability, and few 
opportunities for external oversight. The result is the creation of a closed, controlled 
environment, in which individuals confined are routinely harmed.  
To better understand the human impact of Australia’s offshore detention 
regime, this article examines the relationship between harm and transparency in 
closed institutions.  Behavioural studies and social psychology research – which has 
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substantially informed prison policies throughout the Western world – has 
demonstrated both the critical importance of external oversight, openness and 
transparency for the protection of human rights of people in closed institutions, and 
the inevitability of human rights abuses where such transparency is lacking. This 
same knowledge has not been applied to Australia’s offshore immigration detention 
regime. To the contrary: as this article demonstrates, the explicit policy goal is to 
control information and create a closed, opaque system of detention. The outcome for 
the human rights of detainees is significant. By actively restricting transparency 
within Australia’s offshore detention regime, abuses of detainees’ human rights are 
not only hidden from the public eye, they are inevitable.  
The purpose of such a program is two-fold. On one hand, the government hopes that 
such a harsh detention regime will deter potential asylum seekers from travelling to 
Australia by boat. On the other, the creation of a harmful environment encourages 
detainees to withdraw their application of asylum for Australia and return home. In 
the words of Iranian detainee Behrouz Boochani, detained on Manus Island since 
August 2013, ‘in Manus prison, the pain is there to send you home.’3 The 
government’s key objective is then to deter both prospective and existing asylum-
seekers from reaching and settling in Australia, and this is achieved by creating an 
environment that harms detainees and restricts access and transparency. As Michael 
Grewcock comments ‘There is no acknowledgement of the systemic harm and 
structural violence associated with border controls. Obstructing safe travel, indefinite 
detention and forced removal become routine practices in pursuit of the organizational 
goal of denying refugees the ability to seek asylum in accordance with the 1951 
Refugee Convention’.4 Assessing the type of harm perpetrated against asylum-seekers 
and manner in which it is concealed by the government is the focus on this article. 
Our argument is set out in four sections. First, we provide a brief background 
of Australia’s immigration detention policies and their evolving function as a 
deterrence mechanism. Second, we summarise the literature on the relationship 
between harm and transparency in closed institutions, and demonstrate how this 
knowledge has long informed laws and policies regarding other types of closed 
institutions, such as prisons. In the third section we closely examine five key 
measures by which the government restricts transparency in its offshore detention 
regime: (a) by framing of the work of the Department of Immigration as a national 
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security, military-style operation; (b) by failing to properly regulate service providers; 
(c) by capitalising on the deficits of democratic process in Nauru and Papua New 
Guinea; (d) by placing restrictions on the media; and (e) by actively blocking external 
observers’ access to offshore detention centres. Finally, in the fourth section, we close 
with a summary of some of the human rights outcomes of this policy.  
 
Offshore processing as a policy of deterrence and denial 
Since the introduction of the policy of mandatory immigration detention in 1992 by 
the Labor party, consecutive Australian governments have incrementally tightened the 
management of ‘unauthorised’ asylum seekers arrivals. Offshore detention was 
introduced in 2001 and forms a keystone policy within a larger suite of policies now 
known as Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). All non-citizens who arrive in 
Australian territory by boat without a valid visa are subject to mandatory, indefinite 
and unreviewable detention on the Pacific island nation of Nauru, or Manus Island in 
Papua New Guinea, until their application for protection status is positively assessed 
and they are transferred to a safe third country, or their application is rejected and 
they are returned to their country of origin. Offshore detention, with no guarantee of 
resettlement in Australia, aims to deter asylum seekers who are considering travelling 
to Australia by boat.  
In many respects, OSB has its origins in the ‘Pacific Solution’ first introduced 
by Prime Minister, John Howard and Minister for Immigration Philip Ruddock.  
Between 1999 and 2001 this Coalition government commissioned a number of 
taskforces, which recommended strategies to ‘reduce the incentives of using 
Australian refugee law to achieve a migration outcome’.5 A standoff between the 
Australian government and a Norwegian freighter, the M/V Tampa, with 433 rescued 
asylum seekers on board, provided the opportunity for the government to make a 
public stand against asylum seeker arrivals. The Australian government refused to 
allow the Tampa permission to dock in Australian territory, which eventually resulted 
in the Australian military boarding the freighter and reluctantly ‘taking custody of its 
human cargo’.6 The Pacific Solution was introduced in the aftermath of the Tampa 
affair in late 2001 and became the central administrative system for deterring people 
seeking asylum. The Pacific Solution encompassed various border control strategies, 
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most significantly the detention of asylum seekers on Nauru and Papua New Guinea 
in exchange for a large increase in Australian aid payments. Those who were found to 
be refugees were placed on Temporary Protection Visas, the terms of which allowed 
individuals to stay in Australia for three-year terms and which denied refugees the 
certainty of permanent settlement. Under Operation Relex, the Australian Defence 
Force were charged with the responsibility of patrolling, detecting and intercepting 
unauthorised boat arrivals.  
In response to mounting public pressure regarding the increasing numbers of 
detainees and the conditions of their custody, this exercise in offshore processing was 
slowly wound back from 2005. However, the Pacific Solution’s official closure by the 
newly elected Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in March 2008 was, largely 
symbolic. Construction continued on the high-security Christmas Island Immigration 
Detention and Reception Facility, which opened in 2008. As part of the Indonesian 
archipelago, and with flights only a few times per week (and at the cost of a fare to 
Europe), Christmas Island continued to fulfil many of the criteria of keeping detention 
centres out of sight.  
From 2009 the numbers of unauthorised arrivals began to increase and an 
Expert Panel was created in order to propose a way forward. The Panel proposed 
reviewing the processes for ‘determining refugee status, making it legal to remove 
asylum seekers to any country, a ‘no advantage principle’ whereby any asylum seeker 
arriving by boat would not gain an advantage over those waiting in camps, and 
reopening the detention facilities on Nauru and Manus Island .’7 Labor Prime 
Minister Julia Gillard adopted all the findings and reopened the regional processing 
centres on Nauru and Manus Island in 2012, ‘effectively reintroducing the Pacific 
Solution’ and prohibiting any prospects for refugees arriving in Australia without a 
visa to permanently settle within Australia.8 The Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Regional Processing and other measures) Act 2012 took effect on 18 August. 
Australia and Nauru signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 29 August, 2012 
and the first group of asylum seekers arrived at Nauru on 14 September 2012.  
In November 2013 a Liberal-National Coalition was elected to government. 
The Coalition, under the leadership of Tony Abbott, had appealed strongly on its 
border control credentials, with ‘Stop the Boats’ becoming a central refrain of their 
campaign. Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) was introduced on 18 September 
2013, eleven days after the government’s election to office. OSB is an overarching 
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policy approach to asylum seekers who arrive in Australian territory by boat. It 
encompasses the militarisation of border-control (including the interception and 
turning back of boats), institutional changes to the administration of asylum policy, 
the re-introduction of Temporary Protection Visas and expanding the capacity to 
process and detain asylum asylum-seekers within off-shore detention centres on 
Nauru and Manus Island. Asylum seekers who are subject to Australia’s offshore 
immigration detention regime are detained on a mandatory, indefinite and 
unreviewable basis.  In September 2015, Malcolm Turnbull took office as the new 
Prime Minister. Despite the fact that the Coalition removed the incumbent Prime 
Minister, Tony Abbott, in large part due to increasing public criticism of his reductive 
rhetoric concerning ‘Stop the Boats’, Operation Sovereign Borders remains intact as 
the principle policy managing immigration and border protection.  
 
The Inevitability of Human Rights Abuses in Closed Institutions  
Protecting the dignity of people within closed institutions, such as prisons and 
detention centres, has long concerned scholars, policymakers and advocates.9 Prisons 
have received special attention, and there exists an extensive literature exploring the 
conditions, treatment, and human rights of prisoners.10 The notion of prisoners’ 
welfare emerged simultaneously with, and as a product of, the development of ideas 
of liberalism and democratic governance, which emphasised the respect and 
wellbeing of the individual and the curtailment of arbitrary authoritarian power. The 
protection of prisoners’ dignity is mentioned in the English Constitution of 1688, 
amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America, the French 
Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen.11 Apart from the right to freedom of 
movement and association, the guiding principle is that prisoners should retain all 
rights that are not necessarily lost as a result of their incarceration.12  
That human rights abuses will inevitably occur within unregulated, closed 
institutions is now well established in social psychology, and reflected in national and 
international laws.13 Social psychologists point to the dangers of creating conditions 
whereby one group of people have unmitigated and arbitrary authority over another 
group, and particularly if the confined group has lesser social status.14 Abuse occurs 
not because of the inherent cruelty of prison guards, but because of environmental 
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factors inherent to closed institutions: including group conformity, deference to 
authority, and the identification of an ‘outgroup’ as both ‘lesser’ in status and 
‘threatening cherished values’. Two classic studies of human behaviour remain 
instructive. The 1963 Milgram study showed how volunteer participants, acting as 
‘teachers’, were willing to follow the instructor’s orders to punish ‘students’ with 
electric shocks to ‘lethal’ levels. One decade later, the 1973 Stanford Prison study 
demonstrated how ordinary college students, randomly assigned to be full-time guards 
or detainees in a temporary prison, behaved respectively as abusers and victims. The 
study was abandoned only six days into the two-week experiment, because ‘guards’ 
began to physically abuse and psychologically humiliate their fellow student 
‘prisoners’, displaying indifference to the obvious suffering that their actions 
produced. Moreover, the worst treatment occurred at night, when the guards believed 
their actions went unobserved.15  These two studies, using volunteers, contribute to a 
large body of scholarship on the social dynamics created by closed institutions. To 
explain the abuses of Iraqi prisoners in the Abu Ghraib prison in 2003, Fiske and 
colleagues16 drew on findings summarised in a meta-analysis of 25,000 reliable 
studies involving over 8 million participants over the course of a century.17 The 
evidence about human behaviour and capability gathered in this research, they argue, 
demonstrates that ‘Abu Ghraib resulted in part from ordinary social processes … the 
right (or wrong) social context can make almost anyone aggress, oppress, conform, 
and obey’.18  
Research on prison systems in several jurisdictions supports these findings, 
and establishes the crucial function of independent external oversight in mitigating 
harm. For instance, the Canadian Office for the Correctional Investigator was 
established in the 1990s as an acknowledgement that within unregulated, closed, and 
tightly controlled environments, there is a ‘natural drift’ towards ‘callousness at best 
and brutality at worst’.19 Prison policy in Germany emphasises the fundamental 
principle that a ‘human rights-compliant prison policy include[s] the conduct of 
regular independent oversight of all places of confinement … in order to mitigate 
inevitable systemic abuses of power that arise whenever humans gain control of 
others’.20 Most European countries fall under the auspices of the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture and the Inhuman and Degrading Treatment of Prisoners (CPT), 
which has the power to inspect and report on conditions in any prison in its 
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jurisdiction.21 The United Kingdom has three different oversight bodies, fulfilling 
different functions, and also takes recommendations from the CPT.22 Although there 
exists in many countries problems in implementing policies of oversight,23 the United 
States stands alone among Western nations as having underdeveloped external 
oversight procedures for its vast, and harmful, prison system.24  
Often these national laws work in conjunction with international laws and 
treaties. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966), the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners (1977), and the Convention Against Torture (CAT, 
1984), all explicitly set out the rights of incarcerated people.25  The Optional Protocol 
on the Convention against Torture (OPCAT, 2006) was developed to give practical 
force to the CAT, and this is achieved by independent external oversight.26 OPCAT 
requires signatory states to set up a two-tiered system of monitoring: one domestic, 
and one international. Both are required to have free access to ‘all places of 
detention’.  The most controversial aspect of OPCAT, as it is seen as a challenge to 
state sovereignty,27 is the requirement that state parties allow access to a UN observer 
to inspect all places of detention at any time and with no advance notice.  
How then does independent external oversight work to protect the rights of 
prisoners? Firstly, it can improve the conditions of single institutions, thus bettering 
the daily life for detainees and increasing their chances of successful integration once 
released. Secondly, independent monitoring can advocate for system-wide 
improvement, particularly in advocating for the special needs of minority groups, 
such as women or children. Thirdly, oversight is preventative, and in this way is more 
effective than the law, which seeks to remedy breaches of rights only after they have 
occurred. Finally, it is a key part of public accountability and good governance for 
sites of incarceration.28 Although rarer, there is also an important role for whistle-
blowers from within organisations to alert a wider audience to the social dynamic 
within the institution, and preventing their peers from continuing unethical 
behaviour.29  Ideally, several levels of independent external oversight should form a 
framework designed to protect the human rights of people imprisoned, including 
national and international monitoring and auditing bodies, citizen groups, and 
domestic and international human rights organisations30 
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In Western democracies external oversight over prisons is both extensive31 
and taken for granted.32 The frameworks regulating immigration detention centres, 
however, are more ad hoc, less extensive, and less stringently applied.33 In Australia, 
the difference between the management of prisons and immigration detention centres 
is particularly stark. Australian prisons are regulated by Ombudsman’s offices, the 
Human Rights Commission, and specialised monitoring bodies.34 Australia became 
party to OPCAT in 2009, but has not ratified it, and as such has not implemented a 
national preventative mechanism with free access to ‘all places of detention’ as 
required by the treaty. As this article will demonstrate, this is just one of several ways 
that external oversight is limited in Australia’s immigration detention centres.  
Before turning to the question of external oversight in Australia’s offshore 
detention centres, it is worth establishing the exceptional status of these centres within 
the broader category of closed institutions. We can apply much of what we learn 
much from prison research to detention centres, but there are a number of important 
ways that immigration detention is unique, and thus requires special attention.35 First, 
as an extra-judicial form of incarceration, immigration detention centres are not 
subject to the same regulatory framework as Australia’s prison system, affecting the 
conditions under which people are held, their length of detention, and their avenues 
for appeal. Secondly, the people subject to immigration detention are particularly 
vulnerable because of their non-citizen status, their history of persecution or other 
trauma, and their uncertain future. Thirdly, the mandatory and indefinite application 
of immigration detention in Australia has a distinct and negative impact on detainees’ 
psychological health. Finally, Australia’s offshore detention centres are effectively 
private businesses operating in foreign countries which means geography, and several 
levels of agreements, contracts, and operating procedures, stymie transparency and 
external oversight. Furthermore, the governments of Nauru and Papua New Guinea - 
both experiencing, to different degrees, democratic deficit – have been disinclined to 
facilitate measures for protecting the human rights of people detained on their 
territory. In short, while Australia’s offshore detention centres share many 
characteristics with prisons and other closed institutions, offshore detention centres 
have unique features that further jeopardise the human rights of detainees.  We now 
turn to examine Australia’s current immigration policy and its offshore immigration 
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detention regime directly, and the five main ways that external oversight is restricted 
and inhibited with the current regime. 
 
 
The Militarisation of the Immigration Department 
The formal shifting of responsibility for managing border protection from the 
Department of Immigration to the military has been one of the key institutional 
features of Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB). In a pre-election policy document, it 
was stated that: 
If elected, a Coalition government will establish a military-led response to 
combat people smuggling to protect our borders – Operation Sovereign 
Borders. An incoming Coalition government will treat the border protection 
crisis as a national emergency and tackle it with the focus and energy that an 
emergency demands’.36  
When launching OSB, the Abbott government appointed the Deputy Chief of Army 
Angus Campbell to coordinate more than a dozen federal government departments 
and agencies involved in border protection. In the process, Campbell was promoted to 
a three-star general, and given powers to bypass normal defence force command 
structures.37 At the time, the Australian Defence Association expressed concern that 
having a military officer answer directly to the Minister for Immigration might breach 
the Defence Act, along with the convention of separating military command from 
civil control.  
At the same time, the government department responsible for immigration 
(formerly the Department of Immigration and Citizenship) was rebranded as the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) to reflect the change in 
government policy. Subsequently in July 2015, the DIBP was merged with Australian 
Customs Agency to form the Australian Border Force (ABF). Ostensibly a ‘budget 
savings measure’, the ‘single, integrated border agency’38 escalated the militarisation 
of Australia’s response to asylum seekers travelling by boat. There were several 
implications of this merger. It marked a shift in culture within the government 
department, both in terms of services delivered and the manner in which they were 
executed. Areas formerly under the Department’s remit, such as management of 
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skilled migration, tourism, student visas, citizenship, humanitarian resettlement and 
multiculturalism policy were stripped back, and jobs were lost. Senior ABF officials 
begun wearing military-style uniforms, and its officers were now armed.39 There was 
also a shift in the timely and responsive release of Freedom of Information (FOI) 
documents. In January 2014, it was being reported that the Immigration Department 
had blocked the release of a list of all briefings made to the Immigration 
Minister, Scott Morrison, despite repeated FOI requests.40  
This institutional shift has been accompanied by distinct modification in the 
language used to describe the ABF’s operations. Heightened military language was 
accompanied by obfuscation, justified by the nature of the operation as a national 
security crisis. For example, Prime Minister Abbott refused to confirm rumours of an 
operation underway in January 2015, arguing:  
‘We are in a fierce contest with these people smugglers. And if we were at 
war, we wouldn't be giving out information that is of use to the enemy just 
because we might have an idle curiosity about it ourselves’.41 
 When asked to justify the way he was controlling information about OSB, Morrison 
continued with the ‘battle-ready’ metaphor, arguing he would not be speaking about 
‘on-water matters’,42 that this was ‘not uncommon with military-style operations’,43 
and in another instance that ‘the battle is being fought with the full arsenal of 
measures’.44 In his first interview with the media as the ABF’s new Commissioner, 
Roman Quaedvlieg stated that he would not release information about ‘on water 
matters’, and that ‘operational security is paramount to conducting effective strategic 
and tactical operations’.45  
The securitisation of immigration matters is not new in Australian politics: in 
2001 Prime Minister John Howard also tightly controlled the release of information to 
the public regarding the Tampa and Children Overboard affairs. With OSB, however, 
the Abbott government persistently invoked the imperatives of defence and protection 
as a means of justifying the lack of transparency surrounding the execution of its 
policy.  The hyperboles relating to ‘war’ and ‘battle’ attempted to validate the 
government’s re-definition of ‘border protection’ from that of a civilian law 
enforcement role to a military operation, and to justify secrecy over its operations. In 
some ways, however, the ABF Act extends beyond those usually relating to military 
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operations. For example, ABF officers are excluded from sections 28, 29 and 39 of 
the Work Health and Safety Act 2011. Sections 28 and 29 require workers to take 
reasonable care of their own health and safety and that of other persons in the 
workplace, and section 39 relates to preserving a site for evidence if a workplace 
injury has occurred. As one commentator explained, ‘those engaged in turning back 
unarmed people in wooden boats don’t have to exercise reasonable care’.46  
Australian frontline military personnel, including those engaged in Afghanistan, do 
not require such exemptions 
OSB also saw the expansion of Custom’s service fleet, as part of the 
department’s transformation into an ‘effective Coast Guard’.47  While the exact 
expenditure associated with such an upgrade was not published, it was reported that 
the Customs and Border Protection budget for 2013-14 came in at $324 million. By 
May 2015, the Coast Guard was in full operation, with reports that since the inception 
of OSB, 18 boats of asylum-seekers and migrants had already been turned back.48  
‘Scant details’ regarding two such turn-backs were revealed in a Senate estimates 
inquiry, in which it was learnt that a boat carrying 46 Vietnamese people had been 
intercepted and eventually returned to a Vietnamese port four weeks later.49 The same 
Senate inquiry heard that a second boat had been intercepted, and at the time of the 
inquiry it had not been returned to the country of origin: the ABF Major-General 
reported that it was in ‘an area where we anticipate there will be further ventures’ and 
to discuss the matter might ‘defeat the tactics and techniques’.50 It can thus be argued 
that the militarisation of border control achieves the two central objectives of 
Operation Sovereign Borders: to prevent asylum-seekers from reaching Australia 
territory, and to conceal those measures through a discourse of national security that 
posits asylum seekers and their smugglers as a threat warranting the might of a 
military operation.  
 
No Accountability for Service Providers 
The privatisation of all Australian immigration detention services contributes to their 
opacity. The detention centres on Nauru and Manus Island are, effectively, private 
businesses operating in foreign countries. Several corporations are involved.  
Broadspectrum (formerly Transfield Services) holds the primary contract with the 
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Department of Immigration for the operation of the centres. Broadspectrum is 
responsible for contracting the other organisations working in detention. Wilson 
Security provides security services, while welfare services are provided by Connect, 
the Australian Red Cross, and (until 2015) Save the Children. There are no mandatory 
reporting frameworks between these organisations, or with DIPB. This, and a culture 
of secrecy, has resulted in the systematic under-reporting of serious incidents, 
including medical emergencies, self-harm and abuse.51  
Broadspectrum is a listed company that provides ‘asset management services’ 
across a range of sectors, focusing on a wide range of engineering projects, including 
bridges, coal power stations, oil rigs, power-lines and naval shipbuilding. The name 
change from Transfield Services to Broadspectrum in 2015 coincided with pressure 
from community groups, including divestment from superannuation funds, for their 
involvement in the detention centres.52 The contract from 2012 to 2015 was reported 
to be worth $AUD1.5 billion ($1.4 million per day).53 The contract for the detention 
operations was renewed in 2015, at a reported cost of $AUD2.7billion.54  The 
Department’s contract with Broadspectrum is subject to commercial in-confidence 
restrictions, as are its sub-contracted organisations.  
Reports on the Manus Island and Nauru detention centres describe an 
unregulated environment in which staff have repeatedly behaved in a heavy-handed 
manner towards asylum seekers, and rather than provide protection, are often the 
perpetrators of abuse. In the worst instance, a former Salvation Army worker, and 
another security worker, have been charged with the death of the asylum seeker Reza 
Berati during a riot in Manus Island detention centre in February 2014.55 The Senate 
Committee charged with examining conditions on Nauru found that the high volume 
of evidence in relation to the behaviour of staff indicated that there was a cause for 
ongoing concern. For example, the Committee found that, ‘despite the likelihood of 
significant under-reporting’, the internal complaints mechanism managed by 
Transfield Services (now Broadspectrum) recorded 725 complaints about service 
provider staff over a 14 month period to April 2015.56 These included 45 allegations 
of child abuse and sexual assault.57  The report went on: 
The committee considers that a system in which contractors are essentially left 
to manage and report on complaints against their staff is inadequate … given 
the pervasive culture of secrecy which cloaks most of the department’s 
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activities in relation to the Nauru RPC, the committee believes that a far 
greater level of scrutiny, transparency and accountability is required.58 
The senate committee found instances whereby the ‘pervasive culture of secrecy’ 
meant that some abuses were not known to the Department due to the absence of a 
clear and mandatory reporting procedure between Wilson Security, Transfield 
Services and the Department. For example, during a six month period in 2013-14, 
Wilson Security operated without an internal computer server: officers were saving 
important documents, including incident reports and health records, to their computer 
desktops. The inquiry also received evidence that Wilson Security management 
‘frequently’ destroyed incident reports made by Save the Children and Transfield 
Security by placing them into ‘File 13’, a codename for the shredder. This included 
incident reports relating to the use of unreasonable force by Wilson Security 
officers.59 
The culture of secrecy also explains two examples of direct obfuscation. The 
senate committee reported that Wilson Security misled the committee with regards to 
the behaviour of its staff during a riot in July 2013. Video footage of the event was 
eventually shown to the Committee that revealed Wilson’s account to be ‘untrue’. 60 
The report explains: 
The footage appeared to show security personnel planning to use unreasonable 
force against asylum seekers, and those visible in the footage used derogatory 
language to refer to asylum seekers. The footage revealed a workplace culture 
which is inconsistent with Wilson Security’s role to provide safety and 
security to asylum seekers within the facility…61 
Despite knowing of the existence of the footage, Wilson Security did not reveal the 
evidence to the committee, and at no time did they attempt to correct the record, until 
it was uncovered by the media.  
The second instance of obfuscation is the occasion in which a Wilson Security 
officer fabricated an allegation of assault by an asylum seeker. The matter was 
investigated by Nauruan police and brought before the local court, in which the 
officer gave wrongful evidence, before the officer revealed his deception in a secret 
recording to a colleague. The officer claimed he wanted the asylum seeker convicted 
so he would never be settled in Australia. The asylum seeker, a young Iranian man, 
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spent four weeks in jail in Nauru and attempted suicide three times after being falsely 
accused.62 The senate committee found that the Department’s ‘ignorance’ of the 
matter ‘demonstrates the limits of Commonwealth control or oversight of the RPC on 
Nauru’.63  The event represents the only time a person has been charged by the 
Nauruan police, or brought to court, in relation to an incident that has occurred in 
detention. 
In July 2015, this ‘pervasive culture of secrecy’ was enforced in law with the 
introduction of the Australian Border Force (ABF) legislation. Under the ABF Act, it 
is an offence to disclose ‘documents and information about the provision of services 
to persons who are not Australian citizens.’64  Staff working in the centres risk 
imprisonment for up to 2 years if they reveal information to the media concerning the 
detention centres.  The Act defines an ‘entrusted person’ as anyone who works for the 
Department of Immigration or a contractor to it, and makes it a criminal offence if an 
entrusted person ‘makes a record of, or discloses’ protected information. ‘Protected 
information’ is defined as ‘information that was obtained by a person in the person’s 
capacity as an entrusted person.’ 65  The law effectively prevents employees from 
recording or disclosing instances of ill treatment or abuse witnessed within the 
detention centres: as lawyer Julian Burnside pithily explained, the law makes it ‘a 
criminal offense to report a criminal offense.’66 
Additionally, organisations working in Australia’s immigration detention 
centres on Australian territory and on Nauru and Papua New Guinea are also asked to 
sign to a ‘performance security’ clause as part of their contracts. This clause involves 
payment of a bond – in the case of Save the Children, a bond of $2 million – that is 
relinquished if the terms of the contract are contravened. Contravening the contract 
includes speaking to the media without government approval. Transfield Services, 
Connect Settlement Services, and the Australian Red Cross all agreed to the clause 
and paid the bond. Save the Children did not agree to the clause, and twelve months 
later lost its contract. The chief executive of Save the Children, Paul Ronalds, 
explained that ‘the imposition of performance securities was interpreted by us as 
discouraging us to speak publicly on policy issues’, and that ‘we had to work hard to 
ensure that Save the Children’s right to continue to advocate was maintained.’67 Save 
the Children were not replaced, and Broadspectrum assumed its welfare role in the 
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detention centres: hence there are no human rights organisations with access to 
immigration detention.68   
 
Deficits of Democratic Process in Nauru and PNG  
Situating the detention centres on Nauru and Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, has 
created an additional element of isolation, hindering transparency and accountability. 
Although the actual figures are undisclosed, the detention centres are important to 
both countries’ economies, as a major source of income from Australia and as an 
employer for locals. Nauru, a small Pacific Island nation with a population of 10,000, 
was once one of the wealthiest per capita nations in the world as a result of its 
phosphate mining. After the exhaustion of its phosphate reserves in the 1960s, and the 
irresponsible spending of Nauru’s wealth, the nation faced bankruptcy during the 
1990s before Australia approached it in 2001 with financial incentives to set up the 
detention centre. In 2015 the detention centre is its largest income source.69 Papua 
New Guinea, an Australian colony until 1975, had long had problems with poverty 
and is dependent on Australian aid. The ‘asymmetrical power relationship’70 between 
Australia and both countries has facilitated an accommodating environment for 
Australia’s offshore detention regime.  
Despite covering costs and providing significant financial incentives, 
however, the Australian government persistently disputes responsibility over the 
detention centres and their conditions. The secretary to the Department of 
Immigration Mike Pezzullo has argued: 
The Australian government does not run the Nauru regional processing centre. 
It is managed by the government of Nauru, under Nauruan law, with support 
from the Australian government … The government of Nauru assesses asylum 
claims and, where persons are found to be in need of protection, arranges 
settlement. The government of Nauru is specifically responsible for security 
and good order and the care and welfare of persons residing in the centre.71 
Two MOUs place responsibility with Nauru’s Secretary of Justice for the ‘security, 
good order and management of the centre, including the care and welfare of persons 
residing in the centre’. The MOUs require that activities undertaken by the Australian 
government comply with Australia’s Constitution and laws, and that ‘where no 
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relevant Nauruan standard exists’; the contracts of service providers ‘adhere to 
Australian standards in the delivery of services.’72  Regardless, the Senate Committee 
investigation into the Circumstances and Conditions of Nauru detention centre 
concluded: 
The level of control exercised by the Government of Australia over the RPC 
supports a strong argument that the primary obligation rests with Australia 
under international law for protecting the human rights of the asylum seekers, 
and for the compliance with the refugees Convention. At a minimum, the 
committee is convinced that Australia holds joint obligations with the 
Government of Nauru in that regard.73 
The Committee also confirmed that there was a ‘comparable situation’ at the Manus 
Island RCP’ regarding responsibility.74   
These disputes regarding responsibility are all the more serious when 
considered within the context of recent dramatic incidents of democratic erosion 
within each nation. During 2014 Nauru removed its Chief Justice, Magistrate and 
Police Commissioner, all Australians appointed to oversee the correct dispensation of 
justice.75 In doing so they effectively ‘got rid of their judiciary’.76 Most opposition 
MPs have also been removed from Nauru’s parliament, and the media is tightly 
controlled. According to expelled Chief Justice Geoffrey Eames:  
Nauru is a closed society. The government controls the media, with directions 
that they are not allowed to interview or place on the news any opposition 
speakers…. The opposition politicians expressed criticism to international 
media attacking the breach of law, outside of parliament. They were removed 
from the house for exercising their democratic rights to freedom of speech. 
They have had a very successful coup d’état.77 
The Australian government, however, has consistently refused to acknowledge 
the manner in which such in-country political developments impact the operation of 
its detention centres and the welfare of the detainees.  As Professor William Maley 
observed, ‘the location of a refugee processing centre on Nauru has … allowed the 
Australian government to benefit from the weaknesses in accountability associated 
with poor governance and the collapse of the rule of law on Nauru.’78 While Australia 
maintains the position that democracy in Nauru is satisfactory, New Zealand has 
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suspended aid to Nauru’s judicial sector in protest of these developments.79 In Nauru,  
there has been a striking lack of criminal justice responses to allegations of abuse in 
detention. Of the 50 cases referred to the under-resourced Nauruan police force by 
August 2015, the NPF had laid charges in just five of these cases,80 but to date, no 
Nauruan has been charged for the assault of a non-Nauruan. Nonetheless, Australian 
Department of Immigration official have consistently held that ‘sexual assault in 
Nauru is a matter for the Nauruan Police Force.’81 
In PNG, Supreme Court judge David Cannings initiated an own-motion inquiry into 
the violence that led to the death of Reza Berati on Manus Island in 2014. He granted 
first-time access to journalists and observers during his inspection. The PNG 
government, with support from Australia, stopped the judge’s inquiry.82 The Sydney-
based barrister representing 75 Manus Island detainees who witnessed Berati’s death 
has been blocked from speaking to his clients, and twice deported from the country.83 
However, in April 2016 Australia was not able to obstruct Papua New Guinea’s 
Supreme Court ruling that its detention centres were illegal and unconstitutional. As a 
result PNG announced its intention to close all its facilities, while the Immigration 
Minister, Peter Dutton, claimed that the government would “continue discussions 
with the PNG government to resolve these matters”.84 At the time of writing, the 
Turnbull government had presented no alternative plan for the 850 detainees currently 
on Manus Island, simply reiterating the fact that none of the asylum-seekers currently 
on Manus Island would be resettled in Australia.  
 
Restrictions Placed on the Media  
The media has an important role in providing external oversight over sites of 
incarceration. A key strategy of Operation Sovereign Borders has been to inhibit the 
flow and exchange of information between the immigration department and the 
media. Shortly after the election of the Abbott Coalition government, and at a time of 
much DIBP activity including turning back boats from Australian territorial waters, 
the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection Scott Morrison stopped the 
practice of providing information to the media on boat arrivals in real time. Initially, 
the Minister announced that he would hold weekly briefings, in Sydney rather than 
Canberra, which made it difficult for the Canberra-based Press Gallery to attend.85 
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For many journalists these weekly briefings were unsatisfactory: not all the questions 
were answered immediately and many were placed on hold until the following week, 
and transcripts omitted questions from the record.86 In late 2014 the weekly briefings 
were abandoned altogether, replaced with briefings on an ‘as needs basis’.87 As 
Morrison explained, when questioned by journalists about lack of information 
regarding the turning back of boats: ‘If there was a significant event happening then I 
would be reporting on it ... there is no such report for me to provide to you today’. 88 
In several interviews, the Minister claimed he had ‘answered the question’, even 
when the reply frequently took the form of reciting the line that it was ‘standard 
practice under Operation Sovereign Borders’ not to report on maritime operations.89 
Since the introduction of Operation Sovereign Borders, the DIBP has been 
proactive in applying pressure to journalists covering the asylum matters using so-
called anti-whistleblower laws. At least eight journalists suspected of breaching the 
‘unauthorised disclosure of Commonwealth information’, an offence under the 
Crimes Act, have been referred by DIPB to the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for 
investigation, the largest number by any government department. Six of these related 
to leaked information about detention on Nauru, ‘prompting claims [the government] 
is pursuing whistle-blowers instead of those who allegedly assaulted and 
raped asylum seekers’.90 In one example, in response to an article journalist Paul 
Farrell wrote on the incursion of an Australian Border Force vessel into Indonesian 
waters, the AFP conducted an investigation into his confidential sources. The 200 
page, heavily redacted file Farrell accessed under Freedom of Information laws 
revealed an energetic investigation by the AFP.91 
Nauru has implemented its own laws making it difficult for foreign journalists 
to access the country. In January 2014, it raised the amount it costs to lodge an 
application for a journalistic visa to the country from $200 to $8000, non-refundable 
even if the visa is refused.92 It again tightened access in February 2016, refusing a 
visa to all Australian and New Zealand passport holders (contract workers 
excepted).93 These restrictions not only deny journalists from observing and reporting 
on the conditions on Nauru, they reveal the manner in which Australia has capitalised 
on the shortfalls of democratic process in such countries as Nauru and PNG and 
attempted to abnegate responsibility for the activity and operational matters of its 
centres. 
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In October 2015, conservative journalist Chris Kenny from The Australian 
newspaper became the first journalist to gain access to Nauru in over 18 months. 
Kenny filed several reports from Nauru, most controversially two regarding the fate 
of a Somalian asylum seeker (using the pseudonym Abyan), who claimed to have 
been raped in detention and, becoming pregnant, was initially denied an abortion by 
the Australian government.94 While Kenny was criticized for allegedly being granted 
access to Abyan against her wishes, he also came under fire for not addressing the 
systemic abuses within the justice and parliamentary systems overseeing the treatment 
of asylum-seekers on Nauru.95  Kenny’s privileged access also raised questions as to 
why he had been granted permission at all, and the role of the Australian government 
in facilitating his application.  When asked how he had successfully obtained a visa to 
Nauru, Kenny replied ‘if my public support for strong border protection measures 
helped sway Nauru’s decision, so be it.’96 Far from reassuring the Australia public 
that off-shore detention centers remain accessible to journalistic observation, the case 
of Kenny’s visit instead illustrates the extent to which the Australian government has 
intruded on the media’s freedom to report on its offshore detention regime.  
 
No Access to Independent External Observers 
As outlined above, allowing access by independent external observers is a crucial 
component for the protection of the human rights of people in closed institutions, and 
as such is recognised in international law and domestic prison policies. The lack of 
access granted to external observers to the offshore detention centres has long 
concerned human rights organisations. Since the introduction of OSB, further barriers 
inhibit external review, transparency and accountability of the centres and the 
experiences of those detained and employed there. Amnesty International, for 
example, has been denied access to Nauru since 2012, and Manus Island since 2013.97  
Two examples provide good illustrations of the restriction of external 
oversight. In the first case, Australian Human Rights Commissioner Gillian Triggs 
sought access to Nauru in 2014 to investigate the impact of detention on the 184 
children detained there at that time. Her request was denied, citing the Commission’s 
jurisdiction to investigate human rights abuses within Australia. The Commission’s 
report, entitled The Forgotten Children, nevertheless included a substantial chapter 
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about Nauru, drawing on evidence from detainees, eyewitness accounts from the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, and submissions from staff and service providers. 
The report detailed the unsatisfactory conditions of detention for children and the 
widespread neglect and abuse occurring there, including 233 assaults of children, 33 
sexual assaults, and 128 acts of self-harm by children between January 2013 to March 
2014. On the report’s release, Commissioner Triggs was subject to an unprecedented 
and personal attack by many senior government ministers. The Prime Minister 
criticised Triggs for conducting a ‘blatantly partisan politicised exercise’,98 and the 
Attorney General sought her resignation.99 Another senior minister ‘boasted’ that he 
would not read the report, describing it as ‘unnecessary, irrelevant and inaccurate’ and 
‘not worth the paper it was written on’.100 
The second case regards the cancellation of a planned visit by the UN Special 
Rapporteur for the human rights of migrants, Francois Crepeau, to inspect 
immigration detention centres in Australia, Nauru and PNG in September 2015. This 
arranged visit was the most recent of many requests by Crepeau to gain access to 
Australia’s onshore and offshore detention centres, of which all but this last request 
had been blocked. Given the penalties in the ABF Act 2015 for contracted staff to 
disclose information regarding their work in detention, Crepeau asked the government 
to provide to him a written guarantee that the people whom he interviewed would not 
be at risk of sanctions. This request was refused, and Crepeau concluded that the ABF 
Act prevented him from ‘fully and freely carrying out his duties during the visit’, and 
cancelled the trip.101 The Director of the Human Rights Legal Centre, Hugh de 
Krester, described the cancellation as ‘unprecedented for a Western Liberal 
democracy’.102  
 
The Human Rights Outcomes for People Detained on Nauru and Manus Island 
So far we have outlined the five central measures by which the government has 
actively restricted transparency over its offshore immigration detention centres. 
Before closing, it is important to provide a brief summary of the human rights 
outcomes for people subject to this detention regime. Despite the government’s 
attempt to regulate and control information regarding the detention centres, five 
investigations provide good evidence of the conditions and experiences of detention. 
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These are the Moss report (Nauru, 2015)103 and the Cornall report (Manus Island, 
2014),104 both commissioned by the DIBP; two Senate inquiries (Manus Island, 
2014;105 and Nauru 2015106); and the Australian Human Rights Commission’s report 
The Forgotten Children (Nauru 2014)107. In addition to these investigations there 
have been numerous ‘leaks’ to the media by detention centre contractors in defiance 
of the ABF Act ban on speaking publicly about their experience. Together, these 
investigations and contractor’s accounts provide substantial detail on the conditions 
and experiences of offshore detention.  
The Forgotten Children report and Senate inquiry (Nauru), provide a clear 
picture of the conditions of the detention centre on Nauru. Nauru has a tropical 
climate with an average temperature of 31 degrees, and regularly reaches 45-50 
degrees.108 The camp where families and children are accommodated is a gravel 
construction site, with un-air-conditioned tents situated on loose and uneven rocks. 
The white rocks reflect the heat of the sun, and children are not provided with eye 
protection or hats, and are only offered flip-flops (often in adult sizes) as footwear. 
(Notably contractors are not allowed to enter the camp without hats, sunglasses and 
workboots to protect against the glare and the uneven surface).109 There is insufficient 
shade. The tents, furnished only with beds, accommodate 12 to 15 families each. 
There is little privacy between families. The tents are not air-conditioned. There is a 
shortage of toys, books, play equipment, and other requirements for education, 
including paper.110 Staff refer to detainees using a number, which is allocated when 
they arrive, rather than by their name. Children have referred to themselves and 
signed artworks using this number.111 Water shortages mean that showers are 
restricted to 30 seconds per day. When the water runs out, toilets become blocked and 
overflow, and detainees report that the floors are always wet with toilet overflow. The 
toilet facilities are so unclean that many women and children avoid drinking to the 
point of dehydration in order to avoid visiting the facilities, or wet their beds 
overnight.112  
The reports also detail numerous incidents of abuse, including sexual abuse, 
and self-harm by detainees, including children. The Forgotten Children report 
documented, from January 2013 to March 2014: 57 serious assaults; 233 assaults 
involving children; 207 incidents of actual self-harm; 436 incidents of threatened self-
harm; 33 incidents of reported sexual assault (the majority involving children); and 
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183 incidents of voluntary starvation / hunger strikes (with a further 27 involving 
children).113 The report also documents several instances of suicide and self-harm by 
children, and other symptoms of mental distress including depression, anger, 
regression, bed-wetting, and severe weight-loss, concluding that children on Nauru 
were ‘suffering from extreme levels of physical, emotional, psychological and 
developmental distress’.114 There exists no child protection framework in operation 
on Nauru,115 and many incidents of assaults of children and adults were not reported 
by Broadspectrum to DIBP or the Nauruan Police Force.116 As of June 2015, no 
charges had been laid in relation to any allegations of abuse.117 The Senate inquiry 
also heard allegations that some detainees had been subject to techniques commonly 
associated with torture, including waterboarding.118 
The detention centre on Manus Island, for men only, has accommodated an 
average of 1000 people since its re-opening in 2012. To the Senate inquiry (Manus) 
former Salvation Army employee described the conditions there in this way:  
When I arrived on Manus Island during September 2013, I had previously 
worked on Nauru for one year. I thought I had seen it all: suicide attempts, 
people jumping off buildings, people stabbing themselves, people screaming 
for freedom whilst beating their heads on concrete. Unfortunately I was 
wrong; I had not seen it all. Manus Island shocked me to my core. I saw sick 
and defeated men crammed behind fences and being denied their basic human 
rights, padlocked inside small areas in rooms often with no windows and 
being mistreated by those who were employed to care for their safety.119 
Defying the Border Force act and risking up to two years imprisonment, doctors 
spoke to the ABC’s Four Corners program in April 2016 about the needless death of 
a Manus Island detainee, Iranian asylum-seeker, Hamid Khazaei. Despite presenting 
to doctors with acute symptoms on the 23rd of April, 2015, and medical staff filing an 
urgent request for an immediate flight to Port Moresby, bureaucrats in Canberra 
denied the request, citing that there was not enough information to warrant such 
action. Mr. Khazaei was eventually airlifted to the capital three days later, where he 
suffered multiple cardiac arrests as a result of sepsis and was left brain-dead. His life 
support was switched off on September 5th 2015.  President of the Australian Medical 
Association, Professor Brian Owler, made the case that Mr. Khazei’s death was not 
inevitable: "He could have been saved and he could have been treated properly."120 
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As of January 2016, 1,459 people were detained on Nauru and Manus Island, 
including 68 children on Nauru. The average length of time people had spent in 
detention was 445 days (to December 2015), with 23% of detainees spending longer 
than 750 days in detention.121 As the tragic case of Hamid Khazaei demonstrates, the 
bureaucracy surrounding the Border Force Act and the restrictions put in place by the 
Australian government, have meant that detainees’ human rights are persistently 
devalued and diminished, at worst resulting in the death of those in custody.  
 
Conclusion 
There is substantial and incontrovertible evidence that the human rights 
outcomes of Australia’s offshore detention centres are devastating. The overwhelming 
weight of evidence points to an environment that is ‘not adequate, appropriate or safe 
for the asylum seekers detained there’,122 characterised by poor facilities; neglect of 
the medical, welfare, and educational needs of detainees; dehumanising treatment by 
staff; widespread mental illness and rates of self-harm; and pervasive physical and 
sexual abuse of detainees, including children.123 We have argued here that these 
outcomes are a predictable consequence of policy designed to limit transparency and 
to create a culture of secrecy: policy in contradiction to the evidence that Australia 
and other western nations routinely apply when designing policy for other closed 
institutions, such as prisons.  
There exists a debate among scholars and practitioners regarding the place of non-
government organisations and charities working within Australia’s immigration 
detention regime: some argue that such organisations’ employment in detention 
effectively legitimises the policy.124 This is an important argument and we agree with 
its general principles. Yet, the evidence that we have set out here demonstrates the 
importance of openness, transparency and external independent oversight for 
protecting the human rights of people detained. This would include, among other 
things, the involvement of various specialist and expert service providers in the day-
to-day operations of detention; unannounced and regular inspections by independent 
external organisations; mandatory reporting obligations for service providers; and 
strictly enforced accountability measures, including criminal justice proceedings 
where abuses occur. While Australia’s offshore immigration detention regime 
persists, the policy and its implementation should be informed by the knowledge 
24  
regarding human behaviour and closed institutions. If it does not, human rights abuses 
will continue to be as inevitable as they are avoidable.  
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